This paper describes a new cryptanalytic technique that combines differential cryptanalysis with Shannon entropy. We call it differential entropy (DE). The objective is to exploit the non-uniform distribution of output differences from a given mapping as a distinguishing tool in cryptanalysis. Our preferred target is the IDEA block cipher, since we detected significantly low entropy at the output of its multiplication operation. We looked to further extend this entropy analysis to larger components and for a number of rounds. We present key-recovery attacks on up to 2.5-round IDEA in the single-key model and without weakkey assumptions.
Introduction
The original motivation for this paper came from a simple observation: in conventional differential cryptanalysis (DC) [1] , an adversary chooses pairs of plaintexts (P, P * ) with a carefully chosen difference P = P ⊕ P * that lead to a ciphertext pair (C, C * ) with a predictable target difference C = C ⊕ C reduced-round IDEA based on results of Section 4; Section 6 presents a differential entropy analysis of a single multiplication using subtraction difference; Section 7 describes attacks on reduced-round IDEA based on results of Section 6; and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Contributions
The main contributions of this paper include the following.
• The combination of differential cryptanalysis and Shannon entropy [2] as a new distinguishing tool for the analysis of block ciphers such as IDEA [3] . The new technique is called differential entropy (DE).
• In IDEA, all multiplications are key dependent; that is, one operand is always a round subkey. Therefore, the probability distribution of output differences for every multiplication is key dependent. But this is not a problem, since DE is an appropriate tool to measure the shape of the probability distribution of key-dependent differences.
• Notice that the exact value or even the Hamming weight of the differences are not important for entropy computations, as is often the case in differential cryptanalysis. DE analysis takes into account all possible (output) differences, without ignoring any of them. The more skewed/biased the probability distribution, the lower the entropy. In a sense, our analyses could be interpreted as a kind of low entropy trail analysis similar to that based on a narrow differential trail.
• We employ both exclusive-or and subtraction as difference operators for measuring the differential entropy.
• We demonstrate significantly low differential entropy after a single multiplication, under input difference 8000 x , for any subkey, both using xor and subtraction differences.
Preliminaries
This chapter provides well-known definitions and concepts which are mentioned in this paper.
Definition 1.
The Hamming weight of a string of bits is the number of 1s in the string.
IDEA block cipher
The IDEA cipher operates on 64-bit blocks under a 128-bit key and iterates 8.5 rounds (Fig. A.1 ). IDEA is a design by Lai and Massey [3] , and its main design feature is the use of three group operations on 16-bit words: addition in Z 2 16 (denoted ), bitwise xor (denoted ⊕), and multiplication in GF(2 16 + 1) with 0 ≡ 2 16 (denoted ⊙). Moreover, no operation is applied twice in a row along the encryption framework. The round structure of IDEA is unique in the sense that (i) there are no explicit Substitution boxes (S-boxes); (ii) it is neither a Feistel nor an SPN design; (iii) the round function is an involution which makes the encryption and decryption frameworks very similar except for the reverse order and slightly modified round subkeys. The key schedule of IDEA consists of a linear transformation that simply permutes the bits of the 128-bit key. We do not exploit weak keys/subkeys [4, 5] or related keys, and we refer to [3] for further details.
Shannon entropy
For completeness purposes, we briefly recall the definition of Shannon entropy. Definition 2. Let X be a (discrete) random variable over a finite set {x 1 , . . . , x n } with probability distribution p i = P(X = x i ).
The Shannon entropy of X is a quantitative measure of the amount of information provided by an observation of X :
In the context of differential cryptanalysis, the probability distribution of interest is related to the output difference distribution of a mapping.
Definition 3.
The differential entropy of a mapping F : D → R, for finite domain D and finite range R, under input difference operator ⊗, and output difference operator , is the entropy of the set of output differences corresponding to a fixed input difference i . Denote by o the possible output differences of
. Then, for a given i ,
This concept of differential entropy is not the same differential entropy as used in a well-known book on Information Theory by Cover and Joy [6] , since it does not concern continuous random variables.
In Sections 4 and 5, we set ⊗ = = ⊕ as the difference operator. In Section 6, we exploit modular subtraction as the difference operator. We drop the subscripts o when it is clear from the context.
Differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis (DC) is a chosen plaintext technique developed by Biham and Shamir formerly to attack the DES cipher [1] . The intuition is that for carefully chosen plaintext pairs, (P, P * ), with a given difference P = P ⊕ P * , the ciphertext pairs, (C, C * ), are expected to have a predictable difference C = C ⊕ C * with high probability p. This is a statistical attack requiring O(p −1 ) chosen plaintexts.
DC has become a general type of attack, and it has been adapted to stream ciphers [7] , hash functions [8] , and MAC algorithms [9] .
In [10] , Albrecht and Leander proposed a model to distinguish between the probability distribution of the right key and the one for the wrong key. Considering one fixed input difference and all associated differences for block ciphers in which the subkey gets mixed with the internal state via an xor operation, their model considers multinomial distributions and suggests better success probabilities against combinations of standard DC and its variants. However, it also comes with increased time and memory complexities, for instance, exhausting the codebook.
Note that the subkeys of IDEA are involved as operands of the multiplication or the modular addition. In this paper, we use a new technique, the differential entropy analysis of a single multiplication using xor differences.
For our attacks on IDEA, we exploit whenever possible some well-known difference values, such as 8000 x , that can bypass modular addition and exclusive-or for free:
where the subscript x denotes hexadecimal notation. Therefore, 8000 x is a fixed point difference for modular addition and for xor. This way, we can focus only on the multiplications.
Definition 4 ([1]
). An i-round differential trail is a sequence of differences ( x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i+1 ), where x 1 is the initial input difference to the first round; x j is both the output difference observed after the round j − 1 and the input difference to the round j for j ∈ {2, . . . , i}.
Definition 5 ([1]
). The probability of a i-round differential trail or a differential characteristic ( x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i+1 ) corresponds to the fraction of text pairs that satisfy all differences x j for i ≤ j ≤ i + 1, among all possible such pairs.
DC is also a very flexible technique in the sense that there are many variants based on it or combined with other methods, such as truncated differentials, impossible differentials, differential-linear [5] , boomerang [11] , and rectangle attacks. In a sense, DE is yet another differential-based attack.
Differential entropy of a single multiplication
We start by studying a single ⊙. We use whenever possible the wordwise difference 8000 x , and make no assumptions about the subkey value, which we denote simply as Z , when its position is implicit from the context or not relevant. Using the terminology in (1), the probability distributions of output differences o = (X ⊙ Z ) ⊕ ((X ⊕ 8000 x ) ⊙ Z ) for some subkey Z are listed in Table 1 . Note that, in this table, not only are very few output differences possible, but the ones that show up are not uniformly distributed. Some differences are much more probable than others, and this distribution depends on the subkey value. Plotting a graph of the entropy distribution for all possible 16-bit subkeys in the horizontal axis and the entropy in the vertical axis, one obtains • The minimum entropy is zero for the well-known weak subkeys Z ∈ {0000 x , 0001 x } [4] , while the maximum entropy is 10.444, for Z ∈ {5557 x , AAAA x }. Overall, the entropy is significantly low, because only a few output differences are suggested, and even those that are possible are not uniformly distributed. This observation is valid for any 16-bit subkey value. The meaning of low is made clear when we compare the entropy with − 
99, which is expected from a random 16-bit permutation. The lower the entropy, the better the (entropy-based) distinguisher compared to the expected behaviour for an ideal 16-bit permutation. Apart from IDEA, we have also examined the xor difference entropy of the AES S-box [12] . The result is that, for any nonzero input xor difference, the output xor difference entropy is 6.9843. This is a consequence of the fact that the AES S-box is based on a differentially uniform mapping [13] , which makes the probability distribution of output differences flatter and closer to uniform. Moreover, for the Skipjack S-box [14] , the entropy is variable, but is on average 6.557. Both values are close to the maximum log 2 255 ≈ 7.9943 expected from an ideal 8-bit permutation.
• The existence of equivalent subkeys from the point of view of differential entropy, that is, subkeys with the same entropy and the same probability distribution. For instance, the subkeys 8000 x and 8001 x both have the second lowest entropy, 0.00094254. In general, subkeys Z and 2 16 + 1 − Z share the same probability distribution, which explains the mirror- 
This implies that, under the input difference 8000 x , we have the same set of output differences for both Z and −Z.
In the next section, we use the differential entropy analysis of a single multiplication as an effective DE attack on reducedround versions of IDEA.
DE attacks on IDEA using xor differences
We first attack 1.5-round IDEA starting from an MA half-round with input difference either of the form (8000 x , 0000 x , 8000 x , 0000 x ) or (0000 x , 8000 x , 0000 x , 8000 x ). Differences are depicted in red in Fig. A.3 . Due to the chosen differences, the MA-box is bypassed by these differences; that is, the input difference to the first MA-box is (0000 x , 0000 x ) in both cases. The difference after the next half-round is either ( , 8000 x , 0000 x , 0000 x ) or (0000 x , 0000 x , 8000 x , ), where stands for an unknown set of differences depending on Z (2) 1 or Z (2) 4 . Let us focus on the case ( , 8000 x , 0000 x , 0000 x ), the leftmost scheme in Fig. A.3 . The other case is similar. Whatever is, we know from Section 4 that the output difference entropy of is low (Fig. A.2 ).
We describe two ways to attack 1.5-round IDEA. One can exploit A ⊕ B, which means the rightmost input to the (second) MA-box. Note that A ⊕ B has zero entropy, since the difference is fixed: 8000 x . For a random permutation, one would expect the entropy to be much higher than zero. Therefore, we can distinguish 1.5-round IDEA from a random permutation by just comparing the entropy at A ⊕ B. Alternatively, one can use C ⊕ D and exploit the entropy in after Z (2) 1 , which is not zero but still low (compared to that of a random permutation).
Based on these 1.5-round distinguishers, we can further perform key-recovery attacks on 2-round IDEA, recovering (Z
2 ) if we use (C, D). Suppose the case of A ⊕ B, whose entropy is zero. This means that there is only a single output difference in A ⊕ B. If we partially decrypt a half-round by guessing values for (Z
4 ) and further observe two (or more) distinct differences coming out of A ⊕ B, then we will be sure that we are not dealing with 2-round IDEA, but rather with a random permutation (and the guessed subkey values are wrong), because the entropy should be zero. In general, if we expect differential entropy H at some point, but observe 2 H+1 differences, then we get a contradiction of the expected entropy. Notice that, according to Shannon's formula, H ≤ log 2 n, where n is the number of possible output differences. To guarantee that we got differences from enough pairs at A⊕B, we try all 2 15 possible pairs of 16-bit words with difference 8000 x at the input. The data complexity becomes 2 16 chosen plaintexts. The memory complexity is constant. We guess 32 key bits, and partially decrypt one , one ⊙, and perform one ⊕. If we use C ⊕ D instead, then we use a structure composed of 2 15 text pairs of the form { (a, b, c, d ), (a ⊕ 8000 x , b, c ⊕ 8000 x , d)}, and encrypt them across 2-round IDEA, as in the rightmost scheme in Fig. A.3 . This means 2 16 chosen plaintexts.
We guess (Z 32 pairs using these pools, and about 2 16 of these pairs will have difference (8000 x , 0000 x , 8000 x , 0000 x ) after the first half-round. This is the input difference and the number of pairs we needed in our previous attack on 2-round IDEA. We recover Z
3 and Z
4 , with 2 · 2 16 chosen plaintexts (CP) and equivalent memory, but there are 64 key bits left to recover. This last step can be performed by exhaustive key search.
Differential entropy using subtraction differences
An alternative difference operator for DC is modular subtraction, which, on the one hand, makes differences noncommutative but, on the other hand, such differences propagate across modular addition for free (i.e. with probability 1).
The differential entropy is computed according to (1) with ⊗ = = −.
Let us first consider a single multiplication. We have output difference o = (X ⊙ Z ) − ((X − i ) ⊙ Z ), for an input difference i and subkey Z . Fig. A.4 is a similar graph to that of Section 4, but this time using modular subtraction as the difference, for arbitrary fixed subkeys Z . In Fig. A.4 , we observe a minimum entropy of zero for Z ∈ {0000 x , 0001 x } and maximum entropy 1.99996 for Z ∈ {00D9 x , FF 28 x }, which means there are at most four differences coming out of a single multiplication, whatever the subkey value. This entropy range is even lower than that observed for xor differences in Fig. A.2 . For the AES s-box, subtraction differences give a maximum entropy of 7.2981, which is higher than the xor entropy in Section 4.
Moreover, we observe in Apart from the duality X 8000 x = X ⊕ 8000 x that connects operations in Z 2 16 and Z 16 2 , another motivation to invest in the subtraction difference for entropy analysis is that the modular multiplication can be viewed simply as repeated addition. This is made clearer by Lai's Low-High algorithm [15] for multiplication in GF (2 16 + 1). Let a, b ∈ Z 2 16 +1 , R = ab mod 2 16 , and Q = ab div 2 16 . Then
where R denotes the remainder ('Low' part) and Q denotes the quotient ('High' part) when ab is divided by 2 16 . The following theorem upper bounds the entropy of a single multiplication using subtraction differences and the input difference X = 8000 x . 
Theorem 1. Let
The proof of this theorem is in the Appendix.
DE attacks on IDEA using subtraction differences
Distinguish-from-random attacks using subtraction difference can be performed just like the attack on 1.5-round IDEA starting from an MA half-round in Section 5. Let us use, for instance, an input difference of the form (0000 x , 8000 x , 0000 x , 8000 x ). We refer again to Fig. A.3 . Due to the fact that X − X * = 8000 x is the same as X ⊕ X * = 8000 x , the input difference to the first MA-box is (0000 x , 0000 x ). The difference after the next half-round is (0000 x , 0000 x , 8000 x , ), where stands for an unknown set of up to four differences whose specific values depend on Z (2) 4 according to Fig. A.4 . Whatever the difference values in , we know that the difference entropy of is lower than 2.
As in Section 5, one can exploit A ⊕ B, which means the leftmost input to the (second) MA-box. Note that A ⊕ B has zero entropy, since the (subtraction) difference is always 8000 x . For a random permutation, one would expect the entropy to be much higher than zero. Therefore, we can distinguish 1.5-round IDEA from a random permutation by just comparing the entropy of A ⊕ B. Alternatively, one can use C ⊕ D and exploit the entropy in after Z (2) 4 , which is not zero but still quite low (less than 2).
, Z (3)
2 ) if we use (A, B) or (Z 
2 ), and further observe two (or more) distinct differences in A ⊕ B, then we will be sure we are not dealing with 2-round IDEA, but rather with a random permutation (and the guessed subkey values are wrong), because the entropy should be zero. In general, if we expect differential entropy H at some point, but observe 2 H+1 or more differences, then we get a contradiction of the expected entropy. Notice that, according to Shannon's formula, H ≤ log 2 n, where n is the number of possible output differences. To guarantee we got all differences at A⊕B, we try all 2 15 possible pairs of 16-bit words with difference 8000 x . The data complexity becomes 2 16 chosen plaintexts.
The memory complexity is constant. We guess 32 key bits, and partially decrypt one , one ⊙, and perform one ⊕. 16 computations of an , an ⊕, and a ⊙. This is about the cost of a quarter of a round.
Thus, there are 2 45 2-round computations. A similar strategy to that of Section 5 for attacking 2.5-round IDEA can also be used with subtraction differences. Just notice that for the subtraction difference the entropy after multiplication is at most 2 (lower than for the xor difference).
Conclusion
This paper has described a new attack technique called differential entropy, combining differential cryptanalysis with Shannon entropy. Our target was the IDEA block cipher, due to the heavy use of key-dependent modular multiplication in GF (2 16 + 1), which makes the difference distribution of output differences also key dependent. Furthermore, we observed and sometimes even proved that the entropy can be low for some components, such as ⊙, for most of the subkey values.
Our analyses, using xor and subtraction differences, were applied to 2.5-round IDEA. Table 2 can be used to compare the complexity of attacks on 2.5-round IDEA. In summary, we exploit the biased probability distribution of output differences in (reduced-round) IDEA cipher, in a novel way.
Experiments in IDEA-32, a mini version of IDEA operating on 32-bit blocks, exhausting the codebook (2 32 plaintexts) and using a difference of the form (00 x , 80 x , 00 x , 80 x ), for both xor and subtraction differences, indicated that the entropy increases steadily after 1.5 rounds because of the interaction between the ⊕ operation and the subtraction differences after the MA-box. That means that, although the MA-box output has low entropy, it is not preserved after the ⊕ operations mixing the MA-box outputs to the four words in a cipher state at the end of a round. The measured entropy reached values close to 8 for all four words in the state, which is the maximum for 8-bit words. Thus, we could no longer distinguish reducedround IDEA-32 from a random permutation beyond two rounds using DE. We expect the same behaviour in the original IDEA cipher.
Future work and open problems
There are alternative research directions to try.
• One could try to combine entropy with other techniques to detect nonrandom behaviour such as χ 2 tests.
• One could attack other ciphers based on IDEA, such as MESH [24] and RIDEA [25] . • We have consistently worked with differences based on xor and subtraction as difference operators. Another possibility is to use multiplicative differentials [26] , or mixed differences [15] such as (−, ⊕, ⊕, −), that is, a modular subtraction difference for ⊙ and xor differences for .
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Appendix. Proof of Theorem 1
The representation of X ⊙Z in terms of the extended 32-bit value A·2
16
+B allows us to distinguish the influence of the input difference X and subkey Z on the distribution of output differences. Let Z = (z 15 , z 14 , . . . , z 0 ) and X = (x 15 , x 14 , . . . , x 0 ), with x i , z i ∈ Z 2 , 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. The distribution of output differences Y will be analysed in terms of the 16-bit quantities A, A ′ , B, and B ′ . Consider the following cases. • •
2 . This contradicts the assumption that B ≥ A.
In (iii), there is no difference between B and B ′ , because z 0 = 0, and the input difference X which affects only the most significant bits of X and X + X is not present in the 16 least significant bits of the 32-bit result of conventional multiplication. Two cases are distinguished: • As noticed before, for subkeys Z that are powers of 2, the following equality holds:
where X = 8000 x .
